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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that under current U.S. institutional arrangements, in
which managements opposition to unions is as important as workers and unions,
the magnitude of the union wage premium actually reduces organization rather
than increasing it.It reduces organizing success by lowering profits, thus
giving management a greater incentive to oppose unions. It shows that in the
traditional monopoly model, any given premium can cause management to donate
more resources to opposing a union than workers will donate to organizing.
Empirical evidence from NLRB elections supports the model in which larger pre-






What is the effect of the union wage differental on union organiza-
tional success?
It is common in economic models of unionization to assume thatgreater
differentials enhance the probability that unions will organize agroup of
workers. After all, won't workers want to join a union the greater are the
potential economic benefits from joining? Following this line of argument some
studies of union wage differentials make unionization an endogenous.presumably
positive function of the potential differential.
In this paper I argue that the conventional view that large unionwage
differentials increase organization is incorrect for the U.S. today. It is
incorrect because organization is the joint decision of workers andmanagement,
not a workers decision. While potential wage increases are a plus to workers,
they reduce profits and thus are a minus to management. In an institutional
setting in which management allocates significant resources to convince workers
to vote against unions, it is erroneous to analyze the effect of the unionwage
differential on organizing solely from the workers side, just as it is erroneous
to analyze any economic outcome solely in terms of one blade of the market
scissors. My claim is threefold.
(1) Current institutional facts indicate that, despite the secret
ballot election procedure in which only workers vote on whether to organize, the
decision to unionize in the U.S. is dependent on management as well as workers.
(2) While in the most general model of organization, the dependence of
organizing success on management as well as labor makes the impact of potential2
wage differentials indeterminate, more structured models suggest that the magni-
tude of the potential differential will increase management opposition more than
It will increase worker desires for organization, causing an inverse relation
between the differential and union success.
(3) Extant empirical evidence for the recent decline in union organi-
zation suggests that as much as one-quarter of the decline in the proportion
organized through NLRB elections may be attributed to the increased union wage
premium of the 1970s and its adverse effects on firm profitability, which raised
management opposition.
If the argument inthepaper is correct, reduction in the union wage
impact in the 1980's and the observed willingness of unions to give concessions
to companies facing different economic circumstances, ought to reduce opposition
and improve organizational success, at least up to some point.
1. Institutional Facts
Organization of workers through the NLRB procedure currently involves a
lengthy confrontation between two organized parties, the workers and their pro-
posed union representative, and managment, often abetted by outside union-
management consultants. The process is typically long (2 months between the
filing of a petition and an election),l with numerous possibility for delays and
pitfalls.
In most cases management takes an active role opposing organizing,
hiring consultants in upwards of 70% of campaigns and often breaking the law by
firing union activists.2 (There are 13 illegal firings per NLRB election,3
according to NLRB data).3 Management campaign tactics range from personal
letters, in-plant meetings, supervisor's discussions, and a wide variety of
propaganda in the form of leaflets, posters, and so on. As a crude indication
of the potential effectiveness of such tactics caused the following evidence
from the AFL-CIO 1983 survey or organizers:4
Role of supervisors in Union success rate






While there are no good figures on the magnitude of the total resources
devoted by management to deter unionization a reasonable estimate might be on
the order of 100 million dollars annually..5
2. The Wage Differential, Labor and Management Organizing Effort, and
Organizing Success
Consider first the most broad (and least informative) model of union
organization in which both managment and labor affect the outcome. The vote for
unionization (V) is taken to be a function of "objective" circumstances (x) and




The resources allocated to the organization drive will depend on exoge-
nous factors specific to management X.,, and to labor X Land the logarithm (or
percentage) wage differential (W11).4
(2) =g(W,XM
RL =h(W,XL
From (1) and (2) the effect of the wage differential (here taken as
exogenous, though in a more complete model it will depend on elasticities of
labor demand and other factors) on organization is ambiguous. It depends on the
amount of resources it induces both parties to invest in the campaign and the
effectiveness of those resources.
(3) (dV/dW =V1dR/dW +V2dR/dW]
where V1 <0and V2 >0
At this level of generality all that one can say is that to make
unionization a positive function of potential wage gains is erroneous because it
ignores the effect of those gains on profitability and thus on management
resources devoted to defeating unions in an organizing campaign.
Under seemingly plausible assumptions one can go further and show that
the wage differential is more likely to deter than to increase organization.
Assume that management and labor resources have the same effect on outcomes
(when RM =RL,V1 =V2.)Then the standard monopoly analysis of union wage gains
suggests that management will increase its organizing resources more than will a
union as the wage differential rises. Figure 1 depicts the essential argument
in terms of a standard labor demand analysis of the welfare effects of union
monopoly wage gains. Here W,L are wages and employment in the absence of
unionism; W' and L', wage and employment due to the union wage premium The
wage differential Wt-W transfers (W'-W)L' dollars to labor but costs management5
(w'—w)12 + (W'-W) (L'-L), where the latter term is the welfare triangle
loss. With a given union wage premiumW(W'—W)/W end an elasticity of demand
for labor of r, the welfare loss is WI.
Labor will be willing to spend the rectangle to organize. Management
will be willing to spend the rectangle plus the triangle. Assumethatmanagement
and labor do, indeed, spend the maximum amounts possible. Then:
(4) R -RL (WL)
Differentiating we see that d(RM -R1) W (WI) > 0
dWIA
Management will devote greater resources than laborinan organizing campaign
and will increase those resources more as the wage differential increases.
The model given in the (1) -(3)and the figure is simplistic. It can
be developed in various ways (more complex reaction functions; consideration of
unions and workers as separate groups; different expectations of W; and so
forth). The point is simply that unless one believes that unions fficient1y
extract "rent" from firms along the lines of efficient contract models, it
is theoretically reasonable to expect the union wage differential to generate more
management Opposition than worker and union support in organizing drives.
3. Empirical Evidence
I present two types of evidence on the actual impact of the union wage
differential on unionization: a time series analysis of 1950-1980 changes in
the union wage premium, management unfair labor practices and the number of
workers organized through NLRB elections; and a 1965-1980 pooled cross-industry
time series analysis of the effect of unfair labor practices on workers
organized across industries.Figure 1: The Effect of the Union Wage Premium
on Money Gains to Workers and Loss of
Profits to Employers
Wages
Wi/// //Z/ / LOSS OF
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L1 L Employment7
Table 1 records the results of the time series analysis. Equation(1)
gives the regression coefficients for the determination of my indication of
management opposition --unfairlabor practices (8A3 violations) per worker.
Equation (2) gives the regression results of the effect of those practices on
numbers of workers won in elections per employee while equation (3) shows the
"reduced form" effect of the wage differential on workers wonper election. The
control variables include time and three indicators of the general state of the
economy.
There are three findings. First, consistent with our argument that the
union wage differential increases managerial opposition the coefficienton log
in the unfair labor practice equation is positive and significant. Second,
the unfair labor practices variable has a marked negative effect on workerswon
in equation (2) while the wage premium has a negative effect in equation(3),
supporting our argument that the union wage advantage adversely affected
organization. Third, however, as the significant coefficients on the time trend
variable indicate, our analysis falls short of a complete explanation of the
pattern of organization in the period. To see how much of a change the key
variables explain I have multiplied the regression coefficients by thechange in
the relevant explanatory factor and divided this by the observedchange in the
explanatory variable. For 1970—1980, 47% of the increase in unfair management
practices are attributed to the rising wage premium; one-half of the decline in
workers won per employee is attributed to the rise in unfair practices; and























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































haul, however, the significance of the wage differential is, it should be noted,
smaller. Alltold,while the story is far from complete, the data suggest that 1
the 1970s the sizeable increase in the union wage differential augmented
management opposition and contributed to the decline in union organizational
success.
Economists are, rightly, suspicious of the results of time series ana-
lysis, which often vary depending on model specification and years covered.
Accordingly, I have also estimated the effect of unfair labor practices on
members won by unions using a pooled cross—section industry file for the period
1965-1980 over which industry data was available. The advantage of this data
file is that it permits twoseparatetypes of analyses: first, a comparison of
patterns of -unfair practices and members won across industries; second, an
extremely strong test of the effect of the factors within industry—year cells.
The disadvantage is that we lack information on union wage differentials by
industry and thus can only examine effect of management opposition on union
success or failure in elections, and cannot estimate the effect of wage
differentials on managemenr unfair labor practices.
1able 2 shows the results of least squares estimates of the effect of
unfair labor practice on number of workers won by unions. Consistent with the
results in table 1, these figures show a sizeable and significant impact of
management opposition ——ameasured by unfair practices ——onorganizing
success. The greater the number of illegal acts by management the less likely
are unions to win members in one industry compared to another (column 1) or to
an industry compared to itself over time (column 2).10
Table 2: Estimated Effect of Unfair Labor Practices on
Organizing Success in a Pooled Industry—Time Series Model
1965—1980
Dependent Variable





Log (Unfair Practices Per Election) —.36(.07) 62(.06)
Control Variables
Year Dummies X X
Industry Dummies X




Number of observations: 684 with some industry—year cells missing in early years.11
Conclusion
While theory does not tell us whether union wage premiums raise or lower
organizing success, it does tell us that with current U.S. institutions the
effect of the premium depends on what it does to both labor and management
behavior and gives some reason for thinking that the higher premium may raise
managerial opposition more than it raises worker desires for unionization.
The empirical analysis attributes part of the union problem in organizing in
the 1970s to managerial opposition resulting from high union wage premium.
Hopefully, the analysis and finding will stimulate further work on organization
as the result of the behavior of both management and labor, in contrast to
existing focus on workers alone.12
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